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Summary  findings
Rebelo and Machado describe how Sao Paulo State  the state to complete an environmentally friendly project
granted a 20-year concession for operating a busway, one  with the help of the private sector. The concession has so
requirement for which was that the concessionaire  far been a success  - an example to be followed.
replace the diesel bus operation with electric traction  After an initial increase, demand for the busway began
(trolleys). This was not a "greenfield concession" but is  to fall in 1998 and 1999. This was part of a general
probably the only "busway" concession undertaken  so  decline in demand for the bus system because of:
far worldwide,  *  A drop in jobs resulting from the economic
With roughly 16,000 buses fighting their way through  slowdown.
heavy traffic under traffic policies geared to automobiles,  * A growth in the use of automobiles.
bus service was slow and unreliable. Then Sao Paulo  * Competition  from illegal buses (vans), which offer
adopted certain practices aimed at improving bus  door-to-door  service.
operations. Between 1983 and 1987, it implemented a  The state was late in completing the aerial network for
segregated trolleybus corridor  between Sao Mateus and  the trolleyway and rehabilitating sections of the roadway.
Jabaquara, to be operated as a private concession  This delayed replacement of diesel buses by trolleybuses.
regulated by the state of Sao Paulo.  State representatives indicated it might be better in future
The concession was to operate  for 20 years but the  to find a mechanism through which the concessionaire
winning consortium had to invest in only part of the  instead of the state would undertake  infrastructure works
equipment, because part of it was in place. This made  and would also handle administration of integration
things less risky for the private consortium and allowed  terminals.
This paper - a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure  Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean
Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to promote private sector operation and investment in transport.  Copies
of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Solange
VanVeldhuizen, room 15-002,  telephone 202-473-8722, fax 202-676-9594, email address svanveldhuizen@worldbank.org.
Policy Research  Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/research,iworkingpapers. Jorge Rebelo
may be contacted at jrebelo@worldbank.org.  May 2000.  (12 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less  than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the WVorld  Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.




Pedro MachadoThe Sao Mateus Jabaquara Trolleybusway Concession in Brazil
By Jorge Rebelo and Pedro Machado'
Exclusive or segregated bus lanes or busways are lanes primarily for bus operation,
which are physically separated from other traffic by medians and barriers with grade
separation or priority at intersections.  In general, they are the most cost-effective means
of transport with a demand of up to 20,000 passengers per peak hour per direction.
Traditionally,  busways have been built by the State/Municipality and most often operated
by private operators under a short-term operations contract. In this note we describe a
concession of an existing busway, in which the State's objective was to grant a
concession  for operation of the busway for a 20 year term. In addition, the concession
would include, as an obligation of the concessionaire,  the replacement of the diesel bus
operation with electric traction (trolleybuses). Although this was not a "greenfield
concession",  it is, to our knowledge,  the only example of a "busway" concession
undertaken so far in the world. This note describes the rationale behind the concession,
the highlights of the concession process and the results to date.
The Sao Paulo Metropolitan Region (SPMR), with 8000 sq. km, has 16.8 million
inhabitants spread irregularly over 39 individual municipalities which are dominated  by
the Sao Paulo Municipality (SPM) with 8.5 million inhabitants. The SPMR generates
roughly 20% of GNP and is considered the most important economic region of the
country. Each day, 30.9 million person trips take place in the SPMR of which 10.6
million are walking trips. Fifty percent of the motorized  trips are by private automobile
(10.2m) while the remaining are 38% by bus (mostly private operators), 8% by metro and
4% by train. Of the 10.1 million trips by public modes, about one third use more than
one vehicle, requiring some sort of modal transfer: 78% of all metro trips, 61% of all
train trips and 16% of all bus trips require one or more transfers to be completed. This
level of urban transport activity, domninated  by the road-based motorized modes has
significant  impacts on the SPMR's environment. Despite an existing 250 km rail
network, the lack of integration between the metro and the suburban trains discourages
more rail trips, in favor of buses and the automobile, creating heavy congestion during
peak hours which significantly  increases home-to-work  trip time.
With approximately 16,000 buses in the SPMR (of which 12,000 are in the SPM),
competition for urban road space between buses and road traffic is a daily struggle in Sao
Paulo. While public buses are theoretically given preference through measures such as
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Infrastructure  Department  of the  Latin America  and Caribbean  region  of the World  Bank.  He is
the  team  leader  for urban  transport  projects  in Brazil.  Mr. Pedro  L.B. Machado  is the Managing
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State  in this concession.parking restraints along bus routes, the reality is that traffic policies which enhance bus
flows are rare. As a result, buses are subject to the general traffic conditions that prevail
throughout the arterial network in the area, which keep them from providing fast and
reliable transport services. One key traffic control feature that significantly interferes
with bus operations is the current traffic signal timing logic, which favors the flow of
automobiles. Another interference to bus operations is the excessive time at stops,
caused by the ticket collection system and poor accessibility for bus passengers which
creates longer boarding and alighting times. The result of these interferences is an
average bus speed of around 13 km per hour, headways which vary greatly, and poor
service reliability.
Reserved and Exclusive Bus Lanes
Sao Paulo has adopted certain practices aimed specifically at improving bus operations.
To this date, reserved or exclusive bus lanes2  have been incorporated in about 100 km of
arterial streets. These bus lanes are roughly divided between right-side lanes (52 km) and
central lanes (46 km). In most cases, bus lanes are separated from general traffic lanes by
rubber stud dividers. These types of bus lanes can be rapidly implemented at low cost
and are easy to reverse if problems arise. They are, therefore, quite attractive to traffic
authorities. However they also pose several problems, such as conflicts with turning
vehicles and freight loading/unloading  operations. Furthermore, in the absence of
constant enforcement, regular traffic will tend to invade the reserved lanes and mix with
bus flows. They therefore require constant supervision and enforcement. That problem
does not exist with  segregated bus lanes, because they are protected from other traffic
by some type of barrier.
In 1983, the State determined that the Sao Paulo Metro Company (Metr6) would be
responsible for planning and implementing  a set of exclusive intermunicipal trolleybus
corridors, which would be integrated with the Sao Paulo municipal bus lines and the
State-owned rail-based network. As part of this mandate, the Metro had the task of
implementing the first priority connection  between Sao Mateus and Jabaquara, creating
an interconnection  ring along the perimeter between Sao Paulo (Sao Mateus, in the east)
Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo do Campo, Diadema and Sao Paulo (Jabaquara in the south).
The implementation of infrastructure  works, acquisition and installation of equipment, as
well as the development of the Operational and Integration Projects, took place from
1984 to 1987, at which time the responsibility of all State "intermunicipal" bus service
operations were delegated to the Metropolitan  Urban Transport Company (Empresa
Municipal de Transportes Urbanos -EMTU), also under the State.
2 Reserved bus lanes are traffic lanes which are reserved for bus operations. These lanes are identified as
such but are not physically separated from other lanes by medians or barriers. Exclusive or segregated bus
lanes or busways are lanes physically separated from other traffic by medians and barriers with grade
separation or priority at intersections.
2Project Rationale
The main objective of the Sao Mateus-Jabaquara corridor was to satisfy an important lack
of public transport supply in the southeastern  region of the SPMR, due to very high
passenger demand between two important regional nodes, which until now were only
served by conventional bus services. The program also attempted to reconcile the needs
of the municipalities involved by providing a structural transport connection which took
into account land use and physical ,operational,  and tariff integration.
The project had two basic goals:
*  to provide an intermediate capacity public transport service with a design
concept and changes in the road infrastructure to ensure its priority over other
road traffic. The traffic segregation of the trolleybuses from the rest of the
general traffic allowed for greater commercial speed and facilitated the control
and reliability of supply.
*  to become a factor in inducing a process to reorganize and discipline
conventional bus service in its area of influence.
This corridor project was originally intended to satisfy a daily demand of 250,000
passengers, with operation totally based on electric traction (trolleybuses). However, due
to higher than planned for need of public investment and for a cost-effectiveness
comparison of trolleybuses versus diesel buses, the original project was only partially
implemented. As a result, until 1995, of the 188 vehicle fleet in the Sao Mateus-
Jabaquara corridor only 46 were trolleybuses and the rest were diesel single or articulated
buses. The operation and maintenance of this corridor was done through operations
contracts with private sector companies, while the EMTU was responsible for
management and supervision of services.
The determinant factors in the decision to concession out the trolleybus corridor to the
private sector were:
*  to reduce the involvement of the State in public transport operations.
*  to reduce (by 30%) State costs in the management of operation services
which, until 1995, were outsourced  to private operators. The State would
continue with the responsibility of regulating and monitoring services.
*  after approximately 10 years without being able to complete the corridor as
planned, due to lack of state budgetary resources, the concession would allow
the completion of fleet electrification  which had been postponed for more than
10 years.
*  to allow a longer term concession making the trolleybus a viable option.
Since the Brazilian legislation (Law 8666/93) only allows operations
management contracts for periods not exceeding 6 years, EMTU was forced
to call for new public bids every 6 years to maintain the operation. If this six-
3year concession period for management contracts was maintained, the
electrification of the fleet would be financially unattractive.
EMTU decided that a concession rather than an operations contract for services would
allow longer terms and therefore, a depreciation compatible with the useful life of an
electric traction system. The comparative advantage of diesel buses over trolleybuses
would then be minimized. In this specific project, the main difference consists of the
investment and operating costs of a diesel bus and a trolleybus, since the other
investments on infrastructure,  such as the segregated right-of-way and partial
electrification,  had already been done by the State. Among the advantages and reasons
which led EMTU to opt for total electrification  of the fleet and return to its original
concept for the Sao Mateus-Jabaquara  corridor were:
*  the emission of pollutants is zero and the noise caused is much less than the
normal noise on urban roads, allowing more comfort to the users and less
degradation in the areas surrounding the corridor. In fact, the famous 9th of
July busway corridor with diesel buses, carrying record volumes of 18,000
passenger per hour per direction (pphd) is, in retrospect, a failure from the
environmental standpoint, since it transformed what was once a beautiful
avenue into an area where only auto mechanic shops and depots are located.
*  the operating conditions in segregated rights-of-way is favorable to
trolleybuses because they allow controlled acceleration and deceleration with
maximum speeds which can be limited to 60km/hour, thereby improving
safety conditions.
Once the advantages of a trolleybus operation were identified , both for the users as well
as for the population who lives close to the busway, EMTU undertook a financial
simulation to determine the cost increment to be incurred by the concessionaire by
replacing diesel buses with trolleybuses, all other assumptions held constant. The
evaluation pointed out that the incremental financial costs to be supported by the
concessionaire with the electrification  of the corridor would be equal to 2.5-2.8% of the
fare revenues. The comparison of the situation with project  (trolleybus fleet) vs. without
project (diesel bus fleet plus existing EMTU 's trolleybus fleet), using operational life
spans for the diesel buses and trolleybuses of respectively 10 and 20 years, yields an
internal rate of return of 14% for the situation with project excluding environmental
benefits.
Scope of the concession of trolleybus services to the private sector:
Objective of the Concession;
*  operation and maintenance of the metropolitan corridor (Sao Mateus-
Jabaquara) including total fleet electrification within five years;
*  maintenance  of the road exclusive right-of-way and the aerial network;
4*  implementation of electrification  and operation of the trolleybus system in a
14 km link between the Diadema (center) municipality and Sao Paulo,
Brookline, on the banks of the Pinheiros River, near a future train station.
*  acquisition from EMTU-SP, at market prices, defined in the bidding
documents, as the trolleybus fleet in operation (46 vehicles); auxiliary
vehicles, depots, tools and equipment.
Table  1: Physical  Characteristics  of the trolleybusway
Length  Terminals  Stops  Electrification
33 km  9 (nove)  55 each  way  22.5  km already
Of which:  Of  which:  Or.  electrified  and 10.5
wkm  with
30 km in exclusive  (6 with  physical  111 both ways  electrification  to be
segregated  busway  and  integration  and 4  executed
3 km in shared  way  with physical  and
tariff  integration)
Table 2: Ridership Data in 1995
Total  N°  of  Level  of Service  Maximum  Fleet  One way  Tariff
passengers  trips  Headway




Paying  4.5  92,525  Peak  hour =  5,4  20  46 Trolleybus  R$1,00
Integrated  1.5  Passengers/m 2 120  diesel  buses  (US$1=R$1.06)
Others  0.4  off  peak  =  3,5  23 articulated
Total  6.4  Passengers/rn 2 diesel  buses
Concession Characteristics
Concession Term:: 20 years.  This would allow ample time for amortization of the
trolleybuses and new investment.
Ownership: a) infrastructure,  including administrative  installations, parking and vehicle
maintenance areas, exclusive right-of-way  integration terminals, bus stops and systems
and equipment which already exist continue as state property; b) the trolleybuses totally
depreciated during the concession will be transferred to the government. The
trolleybuses which are not fully depreciated by the end of the concession could be
acquired by the state for their residual value.
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The  Siio Mateus-jabaquara  has an extension of 33km of which 30 km are totally
segregated busway
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Aerial View of the Siio Mateus-Jabaquara  corridor
7Service Specification:  a) the State defines the norms and guidelines for the services to
be operated and these must be clearly specified in the bidding documents. Emphasis is
put on the maximum interval between departures and the number of passengers/square
meter at peaks. The concessionaire  prepares the Operating Plan and submits it for the
approval of the EMTU-SP, which will also be responsible for its enforcement. It requires
that present schedules be maintained for 90 days after contract signing. This would avoid
problems in the first days related to the approval of the fleet in case the whole fleet
required from the concessionaire  would not be immediately approved. Cleaning and
maintenance of the busway infrastructure  is also a responsibility of the concessionaire.
Tariff Authority: the State is responsible for setting the tariff and for reviewing it in such
a way as to ensure the economic and financial equilibrium of the trolleybus system taking
into account its integration with other modes in the SPMR. Tariffs will always be set by
the State.
At the time of the bid, the tariff was flat and equal to R$1.00 (US$ 0.94).  A clause for
annual adjustment  of the tariff was included using a locally accepted price adjustment
index. It was made clear that price adjustments were essentially to compensate for loss of
buying power of the currency. There were no demand guarantees. A clause on how to
readjust tariffs in the 30 days after readjustment is authorized was introduced to protect
against anticipated acquisition of tickets and monthly passes.
A clause to ensure that there would always be an economic-financial  equilibrium of the
concession according to Brazilian Concession law. This is a controversial concept. It
means:
-The State must compensate the concessionaire for any unilateral decision to modify
any clauses that may add to the costs of the concessionaire.
-The State and/or Concessionaire must compensate for any new legislation enacted
after the contract is signed (e.g. new federalstate/municipal) which has an impact on
revenues or costs either way.
Service Remuneration:  will be a revenue for the concessionaire, the revenues derived
from the fares paid by the user, the revenues resulting from legally accessible
advertisement in the vehicles and other revenues previously approved by the State.
Incentives for fleet electrification
- Heavy fines and loss of performance guarantees if electrification schedule is not
complied with.
- A premium of 0.0169% of revenues for each diesel bus replaced and 0.0307% for
each articulated  bus replaced. These values were obtained by estimating the
operating costs of a trolleybus and of a diesel bus over 20 years with amortization
of one trolleybus and two diesel buses and return on investment of 14%/year for
investor.
8Compulsory payments to the State
- 10% of non-operating revenues such as advertising in the vehicles and in the right-
of-way. All advertising projects to be approved by EMTU prior to launch
- 15% of operating revenue over the term of the concession
- 1.55% of the operating revenue for amortization of the 46 trolleybuses
- concession fee to be proposed by the concessionaire in its bid.  The highest net
present value of this payment would define the winner. This fee could never be
lower than the incentives allowed by the State for replacement of the fleet
Important aspects of the bidding process:
*  All companies Brazilian or foreign could participate either as firms or joint ventures
*  After concession award the firm or joint venture had to create a Special Purpose
Company
Obligations of the Concessionaire
*  provide the State all the documentation and information required for monitoring and
auditing purposes
*  maintain up-to-date inventory of assets related to the concession
*  inform the State of any special occurrences which may have an impact on operations
and service
e  not to introduce diesel vehicles for the first time which are more than 10 years old
*  not have trolleybuses in operation that are more than 30 years old
*  not replace vehicles in operation with other vehicles that are older
*  be responsible for any expenses due to alterations in the road infrastructure or in
terminals
*  maintain satisfaction ratings at least at the level of the latest ANTP-GALLUP  polls
- install more automated ticketing equipment  for Edmonson type cards or later on, smart
cards
Obligations of the State
*  Monitor, on a permanent basis, the level-of-service provided by the concessionaire
*  modify unilaterally, the regulations if need be in the interest of the public, with
adequate compensation to the concessionaire
*  stimulate the creation of user associations
*  intervene in the operation if need be, retake it from the concessionaire if justified by
the contract and or legislation
*  undertake periodic audits to verify the condition of the road infrastructure and the
technical resources used
*  undertake public opinion surveys
*  ensure that the eventual increments of traffic in the shared right-of-way are not causing
negative impacts on operations and their costs
*  hire independent safety audit companies to review, evaluate and propose rules and
procedures which safeguard users and pedestrians
9Bidding Process





The Pre-qualification  called for Legal, Technical, Financial and Fiscal requirements, a
Bid bond of R$1 mnillion  and a Minimum capital requirement of R$  10 million and other
financial ratios.
The Technical Proposal asked for:  a) Experience in operation of public transport; b)
experience in operation of public transport in trunk corridors with feeder lines; c)
experience in operation of public transport with trolleybuses or other electrical traction
vehicles ; d) factor referent to age of fleet which would be deployed from the start; e)
factor referent to the acceleration of the schedule for replacement of diesel buses by
trolleybuses.
*  Each criteria received a maximum  number of points. A maximum of 1000 points
would be achieved for a rating of 100%  in all criteria
*  Any firn  which would have 500 points or more would be qualified to move to the next
stage, i.e., the cost proposal.
e  All firms qualified would be treated equally in the next stage
*  The criteria for assigning the points were very objective
*  There were no requirements for a minimum point average for each of the qualifying
criteria
*  one could have 0 points in one criteria but if the total number of points was 500 or
more the firm would be qualified for the cost proposal
C  ost Proposal
- The additional percentage of the gross operating revenue over and above the 16.5%
which was compulsory
*  Fleet Inspection Stage
- Within 90 days of signing the winner would have to submit his vehicle fleet for
inspection and approval
Results
*  There were 3 bidders
- The winner was the Cons6rcio Metropolitano de Transportes which offered 0.45%
of the gross operating revenues over and above the required 16.5%. Gross revenue
is expected to be US$7.5 million/year
- The process started in May 1996 and ended with an award in March 1997. The
operation started in May 1997
10The State of Sao Paulo learned from the Municipality experience ( see WPS
1859) and was more cautious in the design of this concession. The concession was for
the full operation for 20 years but, insofar as investment is concerned, only part of the.
equipment  had to be acquired, because part of it was already in place.  This allowed the
winning consortium to generate revenues using the existing system and helped reduce the
amount that must be borrowed to complete the fleet electrification.  The concession was
less risky for the concessionaire,  and the government was achieving its objectives of
completing an environmentally  friendly project with the help of the private sector. With
this concession,  the State was able to overcome a chronic lack of budgetary resources
needed to transform the diesel into an electric traction operation. Given the length of the
period of the concession, a clearly established tariff review policy and the ownership  of
traffic revenues, the concessionaire had fewer problems in obtaining the financing
required to complete the fleet electrification. This concession has so far been a success
and an example to be followed. The traffic results so far are given in Table 3.
Table 3- Traffic evolution - 1995-1999 (passengers)
_f21
t:;1  5,532,437  5,746,435  5,401,643  5,363,898  4,741,431
5,214,813  5,623,097  5,192,229  5,048,727  4,578,841
6,475,907  6,112,755  5,890,611  6,165,732  5,596,083
5,714,6511 6,235,643  5,925,337  5,727,744  5,004,747
6,221,245  6,102,514  5,763,412  6,155,375  5,229,245
6,126,756  5,771,683  6,029,135  5,834,559  4,928,762
5,929,020  6,066,797  6,294,858  5,846,822  4,873,525
6,432,294  6,474,253  5,878,890  5,991,709  5,028,237
W,  5,086,4171 5,909,164  6,098,434  5,808,699  4,914,123
6,007,340  6,111,077  6,240,909  5,654,271  4,908,075
5,903,340  5,919,973  5,818,919  5,474,578  4,899,083
6,090,546  5,000,027  5,795,304  5,415,191  5,026,544
Total  70,734 766 71,073,418  70,329,681  68,487,305  59,730,695
Ave./month  5894564  5922785  5860807  5707275  4977558
Source: EMTU  Concessionaire took over on May 24, 1997
Lessons learned two years after the concession
As indicated in Table 3, after an initial increase, traffic demand in the busway started to
fall in 1998 and 1999. However, this had nothing to do with the concession itself but
rather with the overall fall in demand in the SPMR. This fall in demand in the SPMR is
linked to a number of factors which also affected other brazilian metropolitan regions.
Amongst those factors are: a) Reduction in the number of jobs due to an economic
slowdown;  b) strong proliferation of informal transport (vans) which are more flexible
and sometimes more comfortable because they offer door-to-door service; and c) a
growth in the motorization rate with a migration of public transport users to automobiles.
Comparing the first 8 months of 1999 with the same period in 1996, the Sao Mateus
11Jabaquara busway shows a reduction of 17% in total passengers compared to a total of
more than 30% for other public transport modes
The Concessionaire and its Obligations
In general, the concessionaire  has complied with its obligations although the schedule for
replacement of diesel buses by trolleybuses is lagging, mainly because the improvements
in the aerial network (which are the responsibility of the State) have not been undertaken.
This might be one of the main aspects of the concession which displease the
concessionaire, since when taking into account the overall concession term, the operating
costs of the electric trolleybuses are lower than those of the diesel buses. The
concessionaire had bought 32 new vehicles by the end of 1999: 22 single and 10
articulated  trolleybuses .As established in the concession contract, the reduction in the
demand is a commercial risk assumed by the concessionaire and does not justify an
increase in tariff. To cut its costs the concessionaire  can however adapt the supply to the
demand by reducing the operating fleet and cutting a number of trips. Although the
concessionaire  did not do that immediately,  he is now starting to do it.
The State and its Obligations
The formula used by the State in the concession contract appears to be working well to
meet the objectives set for this project. However, the State has failed to: a) undertake the
timely improvements and completion of the aerial network which caused the above
mentioned delays in the replacement of diesel buses by trolleybuses; and b) complete the
rehabilitation of sections of the roadway which were already in bad condition when the
concession was signed and which the State had agreed to rehabilitate. As a lesson
learned, the State representatives indicated that:  a) maybe it will be better to exclude
from future concessions any State obligation to undertake infrastructure works and find a
mechanism to allow the concessionaire  to do it; and b) turn over the administration of
integration terminals to the concessionaire.  State's obligations depend on State budgets
which are fragmented and defined by the prevailing political priorities. The challenge
will be to pass on these obligations to the concessionaire without undue burden and still
allowing a reasonable return on investment.
Conclusions
So far, this is a very successful concession which has set the precedent for future busway
concessions. State planners learned from the errors of previous failed attempts at the
municipal level in the SPMR and crafted a model with which the private sector could
live. Recent ridership surveys indicate a very high level of satisfaction of the users of the
trolleybusway. The proliferation of illegal buses (vans) in Sao Paulo has affected all
formal bus trips in the region, and may have a negative effect on the trolleybusway if the
regulatory entity does not step in to stop illegal buses. Furthermore, delays on the part of
the State to do its part, i.e., to complete the aerial network, might also have negative
impacts on the concessionaire  notwithstanding any compensation provided in lieu.
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